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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a Dolev-Yao model with hash functions and establish its soundness with respect to
the computational model. Soundness means that the absence of attacks in the Dolev-Yao model implies that
the probability for an adversary to perform an attack in the computational model is negligible. Classical
requirements for deterministic hash functions (e.g. one-wayness, collision freeness) are not suﬃcient for
proving this result. Therefore we introduce new security requirements that are suﬃcient to prove the
soundness result and that are veriﬁed by random oracles.
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1 Introduction
Motivation.
Historically, veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols has been separated in two
distinct branches. Symbolic veriﬁcation (also called formal veriﬁcation) of crypto-
graphic protocols, originates from the work of Dolev and Yao [14]. The essential
part of this approach is the perfect cryptography assumption that can be roughly
summarized as follows: messages are represented as algebraic terms, fresh nonce
creation is perfect, that is, nonces range over an inﬁnite domain and freshness is
absolute, the same holds for key creation. Moreover, there is no way to guess a
nonce or a key and no information can be extracted from an encrypted message un-
less the inverse of the key used to encrypt the message is known. In this approach
there is a single attacker that is modeled as an inﬁnite process without bounds on
its computational resources. Despite the strong assumptions concerning the cryp-
tographic primitives, ﬂaws have been found on protocols that were believed to be
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secure (the most famous one has been exposed by G. Lowe in [18], some of them
are listed in [10]). The good news about this approach is that a rich collection of
automatic veriﬁcation methods and tools have been developed [21,8,7,2].
In the computational approach, cryptographic primitives operate on strings of
bits and their security is deﬁned in terms of high complexity and weak probability
of success (e.g. [16] for encryption) of any attacker. Protocols as well as attackers
are randomized polynomial-time Turing machines. This computational approach
is recognized as more realistic than the formal approach, however, its complexity
makes it very diﬃcult to design automatic veriﬁcation tools.
Establishing computational soundness of symbolic veriﬁcation allows to have
the best of both world, i.e. automatic veriﬁcation on one hand and computational
correctness on the other hand.
Related work.
In the last years, several works have focussed on bridging the gap that separates
these two approaches. In their seminal paper [1], Abadi and Rogaway prove that
a notion of message indistinguishability in the symbolic model is valid in the com-
putational model provided that the encryption scheme used to implement messages
satisﬁes semantic security. This means that if two messages are not distinguishable
in the symbolic model, then their computational implementations cannot be sep-
arated by a Turing machine in a reasonable (polynomial) time. This paper deals
with passive attackers that can only eavesdrop but not alter or block messages.
Active attackers are considered in [19,12,17]. These papers prove that if the
encryption scheme satisﬁes semantic security against chosen cipher-text attacks,
then security in the symbolic model implies security in the computational model.
Cortier and Warinschi prove in [12], extending the results of [19], safety of the
symbolic model for protocols that use asymmetric encryption and digital signature.
A similar result for protocols where secret key transmission is allowed has been
formulated independently in [17]. Cortier, Kremer, Ku¨sters and Warinschi [11]
have extended these results with hash functions using the random oracle model.
Soundness of symbolic analysis has been proven in the black-box reactive sim-
ulatability (BRSIM) framework by Backes, Pﬁtzmann and Waidner [3]. Recently
this result has been extended [4] to include hash functions in the random oracle
model, it has also been proven that such an extension is not possible in the stan-
dard model. Given the strength of the BRSIM model, this impossibility result does
not automatically carry over to the Dolev-Yao model used in [11].
A soundness result for hash functions that does not rely on the random oracle
model is given in [15]. However only passive adversaries are considered and hash
functions have to be probabilistic [9].
Contributions.
We establish our result in a symbolic model based on [19]. This result does not
directly rely on the random oracle model but instead we introduce new security
requirements for keyed hash functions that are easily achievable in the random
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oracle model. While classical requirements for hash functions are collision freeness
and pre-image resistance, we keep collision freeness but ask for an unforgeability
requirement instead of pre-image resistance. Since hash functions are deterministic,
it is not reasonable to require that an adversary cannot produce the hash of a
message of his choice. Instead we ask that it is hard for an adversary to compute
the hash of a message that contains a randomly sampled nonce. This nonce is not
given to the adversary but he can request hashes of messages containing this nonce.
Using these new requirements for hash functions and semantic security against
chosen cipher-text attacks for asymmetric encryption, we prove computational
soundness of the symbolic model for protocols that use both asymmetric cryptog-
raphy and hash functions.
Paper organization.
The next section recalls the necessary preliminaries for using the computational
model. In section 3, protocols are introduced as well as their symbolic and compu-
tational semantics. In section 4, we introduce our requirements for cryptographic
primitives. Section 5 contains our main result: computational soundness for proto-
cols using hash functions. We conclude the paper with a short discussion.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cryptographic schemes
An asymmetric encryption scheme AE = (KG, E ,D) is deﬁned by three algorithms.
The key generation algorithm KG is a randomized function which given a security
parameter η outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk), where pk is a public key and sk the
associated secret key. The encryption algorithm E is also a randomized function
which given a message and a public key outputs the encryption of the message by
the public key. Finally the decryption algorithm D takes as input a secret key and
a cipher-text and outputs the corresponding plain-text, i.e., D(E(m, pk), sk) = m
provided that (pk, sk) has been generated by the key generation algorithm. The
execution time of the three algorithms is assumed polynomially bounded by η.
A keyed hash function H [6] is a deterministic function that takes as input a key
k and a bit-string bs and outputs a bit-string of the same length as k. Hash keys
can be any bit-string of length η.
In this paper, we only consider cryptographic library CL that contain an asym-
metric encryption scheme and a keyed hash function, we also only consider encryp-
tion schemes that are length preserving meaning that the length of a cipher-text
only depends on the length of the plain-text and the security parameter η.
2.2 Randomized Turing Machines with Oracle
Adversaries in the computational world are probabilistic polynomial Turing ma-
chines (PPTM) that may access some oracles. To deﬁne an adversary A that can
use an oracle O, we write:
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Adversary A/O:
Code of A that can access O
e.g. bs ← O(x)
The execution of A with an implementation of the oracle done by PPTM F is
denoted by A/λs.F (s).
A function g : R → R is negligible, if for all c > 0 there exists Nc such that
g(x) < x−c, for all x > Nc.
3 Protocols Syntax and Semantics
In this section, we consider protocols that allow parties to exchange messages built
from identities and randomly generated numbers using public key encryption and
a hash function. We assume that the same hash key is used by every participant
using the protocol hence we do not represent this key in the syntax of the protocol.
Three types of instructions can be performed during protocol execution: receiving
a message, sending a message or testing a hash. To describe a speciﬁc instruction,
we use terms in the free algebra with the following sorts:
• The sort Nonce for nonces.
• The sort Ident for principal identities.
• The sorts Pubkey and Privkey for, respectively, public keys and private keys.
• The sort Term that includes all other sorts.
The signature includes the following function symbols with their corresponding
arities:
• enc : Term× Pubkey → Term. We use {t}k as a shorthand for enc(t, k).
• h : Term → Term.
• pair : Term× Term → Term for pairing, where 〈t1, t2〉 is used for pair(t1, t2).
We assume a one-to-one onto mapping from Pubkey to Privkey associating each key
k to its inverse k−1. This mapping is extended from Privkey to Pubkey in such a
way that (k−1)
−1
= k.
Protocols are speciﬁed using terms in this algebra and typed variables. That
is, we allow disjoint sets of variables that range over the diﬀerent sorts. A term is
called atomic, if it is a key, a nonce or a variable. Grounds terms, i.e. variable free
terms, are called messages.
3.1 Protocols
Usually, a protocol is given by a ﬁnite sequence of principal identities with associated
roles. A role is speciﬁed by a list of instructions that can be executed by the principal
running this role. Thus, an n-party protocol is a mapping Π : [0, · · · , n − 1] →
Ident × Role, where Role = inst∗ and the set inst of instructions is deﬁned as
follows:
inst ::= Rec(t) | Snd(t) | [h(t) = x]
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where t is a term and x a variable. Instruction Rec(t) denotes the reception of
a message (and its pattern matching using prototype t, which should not contain
hash), Snd(t) denotes the emission of t and ﬁnally, [h(t) = x] checks that the value
of x is the hash of the value of t. A role R is a ﬁnite list of instructions, the set
atoms(R) contains every atom that appears in R or whose inverse (for keys) appears
in R.
As semantics for parallel composition of roles, we take the usual interleaving
semantics. We only consider a bounded number of sessions. Now, it is easy to see
that as ﬁnitely many roles are considered and as each role consists of a ﬁnite number
of instructions executed sequentially, the number of possible interleavings for the
parallel execution of the diﬀerent roles is bounded 2 . Therefore, to simplify the
presentation and without loss of generality (except that we only consider bounded
protocols), we consider protocols that contain only a single role. In order to properly
deﬁne a protocol using a single role, we also have to specify which atoms used in the
role are initially known by the adversary. We assume that the dishonest participants
are chosen before the beginning of the execution of the protocol. Therefore, a
protocol Π is a pair (R, IK) where R is a role and IK is a subset of atoms(R)
that represents the initial knowledge of the adversary. The set IK contains all the
identities and public keys for asymmetric encryption from R. It also contains private
keys related to dishonest participants.
Let us illustrate our deﬁnition and our syntax on the classical Needham-
Schroeder protocol [18]. The description of the protocol in the BAN-notation is
as follows:
A → B : {A,NA}pkB B → A : {NA, NB}pkA A → B : {NB}pkB
Let us consider two sessions: one between A and B and one between A and the
adversary I. This protocol involves two roles of which we consider the interleavings,
the role of B (communicating with A) and the role of A (communicating with I):
RoleABB : Rec({A, y}pkB ) . Snd({y,NB}pkA)
RoleAIA : Snd({A,N
′
A}pkI ) . Rec({N
′
A, x}pkA) . Snd({x}pkI )
The protocol consists in the parallel composition of the two roles RoleABB and
RoleAIA . Let us consider the single-role protocol Π = (R, IK) which corresponds
to the man-in-the-middle attack of [18]. Role R is:
Snd({A,N ′A}pkI ) A sends its ﬁrst message in session A, I
Rec({A, y}pkB ) . Snd({y,NB}pkA) B receives its ﬁrst message in session A,B
and answers
Rec({N ′A, x}pkA) . Snd({x}pkI ) A receives its answer in session A, I
2 Although this number is exponential in the number of sessions, numerous automatic tools are designed to
verify protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. Security results given by such tools ensure security
for a bounded number of sessions.
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The intruder’s initial knowledge IK contains identities A, B and I as well as public
keys pkA, pkB and pkI and ecret key skI = pk
−1
I as participant I is dishonest.
3.2 Executable Protocols
We now deﬁne executable protocols.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A protocol Π = (R, IK) is executable, if:
(i) Any variable that appears in a send action Snd(t) has to occur before in a
reception action Rec(t′). This ensures that t evaluates to a message (a groud
term) when Snd(t) is executed.
(ii) Any variable that appears in an action [h(t) = x] has to occur before in a
reception action Rec(t′).
Moreover we assume that secret keys do not appear in sent messages.
We consider two diﬀerent protocol semantics: one in the symbolic model and one
in the computational model. Both deﬁne the behavior of the protocol confronted
to an adversary. This adversary has total control of the network. Moreover the ad-
versary impersonates the dishonest participants. In the symbolic case, the protocol
and the adversary exchange symbolic messages. Deductions that can be made by
the adversary are deﬁned by a deduction relation. In the computational case, they
exchange strings of bits. The adversary is a polynomial random Turing machine
and can therefore perform any operation it wants.
3.3 Symbolic Semantics
To deﬁne symbolic semantics of protocols, we introduce the entailment relation
E  m, where E is a ﬁnite set of messages and m a message. Intuitively, E  m
means that m can be deduced from the set of messages E [14].
Henceforth, let Π be a protocol given by (R, IK). The relation E  m is deﬁned
as the least binary relation verifying:
(i) If an atom a appears in IK or does not occur in atoms(R), then E  a.
(ii) If m ∈ E, then E  m.
(iii) If E  m and E  n, then E  〈m,n〉.
(iv) If E  〈m,n〉, then E  m and E  n.
(v) If E  m and E  k, then E  {m}k.
(vi) If E  {m}k and E  k
−1, then E  m.
(vii) If E  m, then E  h(m).
Remark 3.2 The ﬁrst rule introduces the initial knowledge of the adversary. The
adversary can deduce any atom in IK and also can generate fresh atoms (i.e. atoms
that do not occur in atoms(R)).
A symbolic trace is a list of emissions and receptions of messages represented re-
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spectively by Snd(m) and Rec(m) where m is a message. Clearly, there are some
sequences of messages which are not feasible.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Valid substitutions and valid traces] Let Π = (R, IK) be a protocol.
Let σ be a ground substitution and R′ = inst1, · · · , instn a preﬁx of R. For any
i = 1, · · · , n such that insti = Rec(t), let Ti = {t
′ | ∃j < i·instj = Snd(t
′)}. Then, σ
is a valid substitution for Π if the following conditions are satisﬁed, for i = 1, · · · , n:
(i) If insti = Rec(t) then tσ is deducible from messages sent before, that is, Tiσ 
tσ.
(ii) If insti = [h(t) = x] then xσ = h(tσ).
In case σ is a valid substitution for Π, we call the sequence of messages
m1, · · · ,mk obtained from R
′σ by deleting all veriﬁcation tests a valid trace of
Π. Moreover, the set of all valid traces of Π is denoted by Traces(Π). 
Example 3.4 Let us consider once more the Needham-Schroeder protocol intro-
duced previously. The man-in-the-middle attack presented in [18] uses only the
following preﬁx of the role:
Snd({A,N ′A}pkI ) A sends its ﬁrst message in session A, I
Rec({A, y}pkB ) . Snd({y,NB}pkA) B receives its ﬁrst message and answers
Rec({N ′A, x}pkA) . Snd({x}pkI ) A receives its answer in session A, I
Then the attack corresponds to valid substitution σ deﬁned by:
σ =
(
x → NB , y → N
′
A
)
The corresponding trace is given hereafter. It is easy to check that this trace is
valid.
Snd({A,NA}pkI ).Rec({A,NA}pkB).Snd({NA, NB}pkA).
Rec({NA, NB}pkA).Snd({NB}pkI ).

3.4 Computational Semantics
We want to let the adversary have arbitrary control over the network, as in the
symbolic model, and hence we eliminate the network. Moreover, the adversary
drives the computation by sending messages to the other players and receiving
messages from them. In the computational model, the messages that are exchanged
are bit-strings (and depend on the security parameter η). However, we assume types
corresponding to the diﬀerent ranges of the cryptographic primitives: Mag, Mn,
Mpk, Msk, Ma, Mh and Mp for principal identities, nonces, public keys, secret keys,
cipher-texts, hashes and pairs, respectively. Moreover, we assume a polynomial
time type retrieval function type : M → Types, where Types is the set of all types.
We also assume that equality of bit-strings holds only when types coincide, i.e.
bs = bs′ implies type(bs) = type(bs′). Concerning pairs, we assume that there are
two deterministic polynomial algorithms pr1 and pr2 such that pri(bs1 · bs2) = bsi.
R. Janvier et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 186 (2007) 121–139 127
Now, a computational trace is a sequence of emissions and receptions of bit-
strings denoted respectively by Snd(bs) and Rec(bs), where Snd(bs) is a message sent
by a principal and received by the adversary, while Rec(bs) is a message received by
a principal and sent by the adversary.
Throughout this section, let Π = (〈inst1, · · · , inst〉, IK) be a ﬁxed arbitrary
protocol. Moreover, let CL be a cryptographic library composed by an asymmetric
encryption scheme AE = (KG, E ,D) and a keyed hash function H.
The computational semantics is deﬁned by the random algorithm Exec given in
Figure 3.1.Some explanatory remarks are of order.
• Exec is given as input an adversary A, a protocol Π = (〈inst1, · · · , inst〉, IK)
and an initial mapping θ from bit-strings to nonces, keys and identities from
atoms(〈inst1, · · · , inst〉). The value of θ is computed using the key generation
algorithm of CL and an algorithm for generating values for nonces. Henceforth,
we write θ ← Init(Π) to denote the sampling of the initial value of θ. We assume
that θ also associates a hash key to kH .
Let us call IK(θ) the restriction of θ to atoms in IK and to kH .
• The output of Exec is a computational trace recording the interaction between
the adversary and the principals running the protocol, the ﬁnal substitution θ
and the ﬁnal memory mem of the adversary. Our main theorem in Section 5
states that the produced computational trace corresponds to a valid symbolic
trace with overwhelming probability. The other outputs, θ and mem, are used
when considering properties over protocols.
• Exec modiﬁes θ, it also uses a list trace that contains the computational trace
eventually output by Exec. Exec uses two auxiliary functions:
(i) concr that takes as arguments a term t and a computational substitution θ and
returns a computational value, i.e. a bit-string for t.
(ii) parse that takes as arguments a bit-string bs, a term t and a computational
substitution θ and returns an updated version of θ (obtained by matching bs
with t).
Due to space contraints, we do not present the algorithms of concr and parse
which are quite obvious. The two algorithms use the cryptographic primitives of
CL.
• Some errors may be raised during execution. When an error is raised, execution
is aborted and control ﬂow is transferred to the ﬁnal return statement in Exec.
Errors may be raised by Exec when a hash veriﬁcation test fails or by the parse
function. This function may raise errors in the following situations. The value
of x in θ is needed but θ(x) is undeﬁned or does not have the expected value; in
this case, the protocol cannot be executed. An error is also raised when the type
of a bit-string is not the expected one or when a call to the decryption algorithm
or to one of the projection algorithms fails.
R. Janvier et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 186 (2007) 121–139128
Figure 3.1 Exec Algorithm
Exec(A, IK, 〈inst1...inst〉, θ) :
trace := []; mem := IK(θ); Initialisation
for i from 1 to 
match insti with
[[h(t1) = t2]] Hash veriﬁcation
if H(concr(kH , θ), concr(t1, θ)) 	= concr(t2, θ)
then raise test-failed
[Rec(t)] Message reception
(bs,mem) := A(mem)
θ := parse(bs, t, θ)
trace := trace :: Rec(bs)
[Snd(t)] Message emission
bs := concr(t, θ)
trace := trace :: Snd(bs)
mem := A(bs,mem)
endmatch
endfor
return (trace, θ,mem)
3.5 Protocol Properties
For both the symbolic and the computational model, a trace property is given by
a set of traces; a set of symbolic traces in the ﬁrst case and a set of computational
traces in the second.
3.5.1 Symbolic Properties
In the case of the symbolic semantics, a protocol Π satisﬁes a trace property ψ, if
all valid traces of Π are in ψ.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Let Π be a protocol and let ψ be a set of symbolic traces. Then,
Π satisﬁes ψ, denoted by Π |=f ψ, if Traces(Π) ⊆ ψ.
Authentication properties, such as aliveness, weak agreement, non-injective
agreement, are typical trace properties. Another trace property extensively studied
is non-deductibility.
Deﬁnition 3.6 Let m be a symbolic message. Let Π be a protocol. We denote by
Secret(m) the set of symbolic traces m1, · · · ,mn such that {m1, · · · ,mn} 	 m and
we say that Π satisﬁes Secret(m), if Π |=f Secret(m).
3.5.2 Computational Properties
A computational trace property is a set of computational traces that is a set of
sequences of bit-strings. A protocol Π satisﬁes a trace property, if for any adversary
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the probability to obtain a trace that does not satisfy the property is negligible.
More formally, we have the following:
Deﬁnition 3.7 Let Π = (R, IK) be a protocol and let φ be a set of computational
traces. Then, Π satisﬁes φ, denoted by Π |=c φ, if for every adversary A,
Pr[θ ← Init(Π) ; Exec(A, IK, R, θ) 	∈ φ]
is negligible as a function of η. Notice that the probability is taken over the coin
tosses used for computing θ, the coin tosses of A and the coin tosses of the algorithms
in CL.
We now deﬁne another property corresponding to the strong secrecy of nonces
SecNonce [12]. This property states that it is hard for an adversary to distinguish
the nonce that is used in the execution of the protocol from a random nonce. In
the SecNonceb experiment, after execution of the protocol, the adversary is given
two nonce values bs0 and bs1 and has to decide which was used in the execution.
SecNonceb(A, IK, R, θ,N) :
bs0
R
← {0, 1}η
bs1
R
← {0, 1}η
θ ← θ[bsb/N ]
(tc, θ
′,mem)
R
← Exec(A, IK, R, θ)
d
R
← A(tc, bs0, bs1,mem)
Deﬁnition 3.8 Let Π be a protocol (R, IK) and N a nonce of Π. For any adversary
A, we deﬁne the SecNonce-advantage of A as follows:
AdvSecNonce,NA,IK,R (η) = 2Pr[ θ
R
← Init(Π) ; b
R
← {0, 1} ;
d
R
← SecNonceb(A, IK, R, θ,N) : d = b]− 1
A protocol Π satisﬁes SecNonce(N), if AdvSecNonce,NA,IK,R (η) is negligible, for any ad-
versary A.
4 Security Deﬁnitions for Cryptographic Primitives
Security deﬁnitions are introduced using security criteria and associated security
games (experiments). A security criterion deﬁnes a game involving an adversary.
The experiment proceeds as follows. First some parameters θ are randomly gen-
erated. The adversary is executed and can use an oracle F which depends on θ.
At the end, the adversary has to answer a string of bits which is veriﬁed by an
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algorithm V which also uses θ (e.g. θ includes a bit b and the adversary has to
output the value of b).
Deﬁnition 4.1 A security criterion γ is a triple (Θ;F ;V ) where
• Θ is a PPTM that given a security value η randomly generates some challenge θ
(for example, a bit b and a pair of keys (pk, sk)).
• F is a PPTM that takes as arguments a string of bits s and a challenge θ and
outputs a new string of bits. F represents the oracles that an adversary can call
to solve its challenge.
• V is a PPTM that takes as arguments a string of bits s and a challenge θ and
outputs either true or false. It represents the veriﬁcation made on the result com-
puted by the adversary. The answer true (resp. false) means that the adversary
solved (resp. did not solve) the challenge.
Remark 4.2 Note that Θ can generate an arbitrary number of parameters and F
can represent an arbitrary number of oracles. Thus, it is possible to deﬁne criteria
with multiple Θ and F .
The advantage of a PPTM A against γ is
AdvγA(η) = 2
(
Pr[GγA(η) = true]− PrRand
γ
)
where G is the Turing machine deﬁned by:
Game GγA(η):
θ←Θ(η)
d←A(η)/λs.F (s, θ)
return V (d, θ)
and PrRandγ is the best probability to solve the challenge that an adversary can
have without using oracle F . Formally, PrRandγ is the maximum of Pr[Gγ
′
A(η) =
true] where A ranges over any possible PPTM and γ′ is the criterion (Θ; 
;V ).
We also consider criteria with multiple veriﬁers denoted by γ = (Θ;F ;V1, ..., Vn).
Then the advantage of an adversary A is deﬁned by:
AdvγA(η) = max1≤i≤n
(
Adv
(Θ;F ;Vi)
A (η)
)
A criterion γ is said safe iﬀ the advantage of any adversary against γ is negligible.
4.1 Asymmetric Encryption
For the asymmetric encryption scheme we use the N -IND-CCA criterion which is
equivalent to the classical IND-CCA criterion [5].
Deﬁnition 4.3 [N -IND-CCA]
Let AE = (KG, E ,D) be an asymmetric encryption scheme. Then, the N -IND-CCA
criterion associated with AE , denoted by γN , is given by (Θ;F ;V ), where:
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(i) Θ generates N pairs of keys (pk1, sk1) to (pkN , skN ) using KG and a bit b at
random;
(ii) V veriﬁes that the adversary outputs the right value for bit b; and
(iii) F gives access to three oracles for each i between 1 and N :
(a) a left-right encryption oracle that takes as arguments two bit-strings of
equal length (bs0, bs1) and outputs the encryption of bsb with pki;
(b) a decryption oracle that decodes any message not produced by the former
encryption oracle;
(c) an oracle that simply makes the public key available.
An asymmetric encryption scheme AE is said N -IND-CCA iﬀ γN is safe.
4.2 Hash Functions
Hash functions are typically used to reduce the size of a message: all the possible
outputs of the hash functions have the same size. Moreover, as hash algorithm are
deterministic, it is possible to test that a hash result and a bit-string correspond.
However hashed messages can be used to make commitments on a bit-string, thus
it should be diﬃcult to ﬁnd two message that have the same hash, this is called a
collision. It should also be diﬃcult from a hashed message to recover the underlying
bit-string. Previous works in provable cryptography have introduced numerous
security requirements for hash functions [20]. Among these requirements, the three
most commonly used criteria are:
• Preimage resistance (Pre): given a hash Y and the key K used, it should be
impossible, except with non-negligible probability, to ﬁnd a bit-string M ′ such
that H(K,M ′) = Y . That is, the following probability must be negligible in η
for any adversary A and a given polynomial p:
Pr[K ← {0, 1}η ; M ← {0, 1}p(η) ;
Y ←H(K,M); M ′ ← A(K,Y ) : H(K,M ′) = Y ]
• Second-preimage resistance (Sec): given a bit-string M and a key K, it
should be impossible, except with non-negligible probability, to ﬁnd a diﬀerent
bit-string M ′ such that H(K,M) = H(K,M ′). That is, the following probability
must be negligible in η for any adversary A and a given polynomial p:
Pr[K ← {0, 1}η ; M ← {0, 1}p(η) ;
M ′ ← A(K,M) : M 	= M ′ ∧ H(K,M) = H(K,M ′)]
• Collision resistance: (Col) it should be impossible, except with non-negligible
probability, given a key K, to ﬁnd two diﬀerent bit-strings M and M ′ such that
H(K,M) = H(K,M ′). That is, the following probability must be negligible in η
for any adversary A:
Pr[K ← {0, 1}η ; (M,M ′) ← A(K) : M 	= M ′ ∧ H(K,M) = H(K,M ′)]
There are some well-known implications between the three previous criteria [20]:
criterion Pre is implied by criterion Sec and Sec is itself implied by Col.
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As there are no collisions in the symbolic setting, it is natural to require non-
collision when proving computational soundness.
In the symbolic setting, the adversary cannot deduce from a hashed message
h(m) the underlying message m. In the computational setting, we have to ensure
that an adversary is not able to deduce signiﬁcative parts of a bit-string from its
hashed value. For example, given H(kH , bs1 · bs2), an adversary should not be able,
with non-negligible probability, to deduce bs1, or to produce a new hash of a message
containing bs1, if the length of bs1 depends on the security parameter. The Pre
and Sec requirements are not suﬃcient in this case as they only provide that the
adversary is not able to produce bs1 · bs2.
Another approach to ensure security of hash functions is to use probabilistic hash
functions citecanetti-hash. Whilst the security notion described in citecanetti-hash
ensure that any hash preserves any partial information over the hashed message, it
does not ensure that given a hash containing a secret nonce, it is impossible to forge
a new hash containing the secret nonce. Moreover the hash functions considered
are probabilistic.
Hence we deﬁne a new criterion for hash functions. We want to ensure that hash
functions satisfy a form of semantic security. However it is not possible to directly
adapt classical deﬁnitions as hash functions are deterministic. The adversary cannot
have full access to a left-right hash oracle. Therefore we introduce a new security
game where ﬁrst some challenge nonces are randomly sampled. The adversary has
access to a left-right oracle but his queries are not directly hashed: the challenge
nonces are inserted in these queries before applying the hash function.
For that purpose, the left-right oracle takes as arguments pattern terms instead
of bit-strings. Pattern terms as deﬁned as follows.
4.2.1 Patterns
Pattern terms are terms where new atomic constants have been added: pattern
variables. These variables represent challenge nonces whose values are not known
by the adversary.
pat ::= 〈pat, pat〉 | bs | [i]
The computation (evaluation) made by the oracle is easily deﬁned recursively by
replacing each variable [i] by its value denoted by θ(i). The concatenation operator
is still denoted by ·.
v(bs, θ) = bs v([i], θ) = θ(i) v(〈p1, p2〉, θ) = v(p1, θ) · v(p2, θ)
We deﬁne the length of a pattern pat as the length of any result of v(pat, θ),
for a given θ. The evaluation algorithm v is close to the concr algorithm . However
as the main use for v is to perform operations on secret keys and concr is more
general, we use two diﬀerent algorithms.
A pattern is hollow if it contains at least one pattern variable.
Deﬁnition 4.4 [HASH]
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Let H be a keyed hash function [6]. Then, the HASH criterion associated with H,
denoted by γH , is given by (Θ;F ;VUNF , VNC), where:
(i) Θ randomly generates a nonce NH of length η and a hash key k.
(ii) F gives access to three oracles:
• a hashing oracle HN which takes as input a hollow pattern pat, which has
never been given to the oracle before, and returns the hash with k of pat
completed with NH ;
• an oracle Store which keeps in memory each bit-string issued by the adver-
sary;
• a hash key oracle which returns k.
(iii) VUNF veriﬁes if a bit-string bs has been produced by the hashing oracle whilst
it has been given prior to the oracle Store.
(iv) VNC takes as input two diﬀerent patterns, not necessarily hollow, and veriﬁes
if, completed with NH , they have the same hash with the key k.
A hash function H is said HASH iﬀ γH is safe.
We denote by HASH/UNF=(Θ;F ;VUNF ) the subcriterion related to the un-
forgeability of hashes if some part of the hashed message is unknown and
HASH/NC=(Θ;F ;VNC ) the subcriterion related to the collision criterion.
We note that HASH/NC is equivalent to the criterion Col and that HASH
implies Pre. We also remark that in the random oracle model, the existence of
a hash function that satisﬁes HASH is trivial (the hash function is given by the
random oracle). On the other hand, in the standard model, we are not aware of an
implementation satisfying HASH.
Similarly to IND-CCA, HASH can be extended to an equivalent criterion denoted
by N -HASH where N challenge nonces are generated and used by the hashing oracle.
Proposition 4.5 A hash function is HASH if an only if it is N -HASH, for any
given N > 0.
Proof. The fact that N -HASH implies HASH is obvious. To prove the converse,
let us consider an adversary A against N -HASH/UNF. We build an adversary B
against HASH/UNF. The adversary A has to produce a new hash of a message
containing at least one of her challenge nonces. The adversary B randomly chooses
an integer i between 1 and N . She simulates A by generating N − 1 nonces and
assigning it to the challenge nonces of A, except for the i-th challenge nonce, which is
associated with the challenge nonce of A. This way, B wins her challenge whenever
A wins her challenge by producing a new hash of a message containing the i-th
challenge nonce. Hence
Adv
N−HASH/UNF
A (η) ≤ N.Adv
HASH/UNF
B (η)
The implication of N -HASH/NC by HASH/NC is similar.

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4.3 Security of the Cryptographic Library
Here we deﬁne the security of nested cryptographic primitives. This is done using
a criterion that combines the two previous ones. That is, N asymmetric keys
are generated together with a hash key k, N nonces NHi and a challenge bit b.
The adversary can access oracles he was granted in the previous criteria (left-right
encryption, public key and decryption for the asymmetric scheme, hashing and
storing for the hash function) and can win either by deducing the value of b, by
ﬁnding two diﬀerent patterns having the same hash or by obtaining a bit-string
with his hashing oracle that is already in Store. The encryption oracles now accept
in input pairs of patterns (pat0, pat1) of equal length and output the encryption of
the pattern patb completed with the corresponding N
H
i . Patterns for these oracle
are given by the following grammar:
pat ::= 〈pat, pat〉 | bs | [i]
| {pat}bs encryption
| h(pat) hashing
The evaluation algorithm v is extended in a straightforward way to handle these
patterns.
Let γN be the criterion including the oracles detailed above and the following
veriﬁers: VIND that returns true for bit b, VUNF that returns true if the hashing
oracle outputs a bit-string already in Store and VNC that returns true if it is given
two diﬀerent patterns which have the same hash.
Deﬁnition 4.6 A cryptographic library (AE ,H) is said N -PAH iﬀ for any adver-
sary A in PPTM the advantage AdvγNA (η) is negligible and the PrRand related
to collision is negligible.
Such a library exists under the hypothesis that there exists an IND-CCA asym-
metric encryption scheme and a HASH hash function.
Proposition 4.7 If a cryptographic library CL is IND-CCA and HASH, it is also
N -PAH.
Proof. This proof can easily be done using the partition theorem presented in [13].
We only give a proof sketch. Let A be an adversary against N -PAH. The intuition
behind the proof is that if A is able to win against the indistinguishability criterion,
then we can build an adversary B1 against N -IND-CCA who wins her challenge
whenever B wins her own. If A is able to win against the non-collision challenge,
then an adversary B2 against N -HASH is able to win her collision challenge by
simalting A. The idea is that B2 does not have to use her challenge nonces to
simulate A, she can generates new one, so she can simulate the encryption oracle
easily, If A is able to win against the unforgeability criterion, we build an adversary
B3 against the unforgeability of N -PAH that simulates A using her own hashing
oracle, but using newly generated nonces for the encryption oracle. The idea is that
either behavior of A is not aﬀected by the “incorrect” answers produced by the
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encryption oracle, and then the advantage of B3 is the same that the advantage of
A, or the behavior of A is diﬀerent, and in this case we can build an adversary B4
against N -IND-CCA that distinguish the normal behavior of A from her behavior
when she is simulated by B3. Hence the advantage of A is bounded by a sum of the
advantages of B1, B2, B3 and B4 which is negligible. 
5 Computational Soundness of the Symbolic Semantics
In this section, we prove that under some hypotheses on the considered protocol and
cryptographic primitives any computational trace has a valid symbolic abstraction
except for negligible probability. We then exploit this to show a preservation result
that states that if a symbolic trace property is satisﬁed then its computational
concretization is also satisﬁed.
5.1 Hypotheses on protocols
Our hypotheses on protocols are either syntactic or automatically provable in the
symbolic semantics. The ﬁrst hypothesis is that we only consider executable proto-
cols (see Def. 3.1). Second, we only consider protocols that preserve secrecy. That
is, we assume that for any atomic message a ∈ atom(Π) either Π |=f Secret(a) or
a ∈ IK (see Def. 3.6).
A protocol that satisﬁes these restrictions is called well-formed.
5.2 Relating Computational and Symbolic Traces
In order to state our theorem, we need to deﬁne the concretization of a symbolic
trace tf . As we are dealing with cryptographic primitives that are not deterministic
there is, in general, a set of concretizations of tf . Therefore, given a symbolic trace
tf , we denote by Concr(tf , θ) the set of computational traces obtained by applying
concr(·, θ′) on each symbolic message of tf where θ
′ is a mapping from bit-strings
to symbolic messages compatible with θ. Then, we can state our main theorem as
follows.
Theorem 5.1 Let Π = (R, IK) be a well-formed protocol that uses a Q-PAH secure
cryptographic library, where Q is the sum of the numbers of keys and nonces in Π.
Let A be an adversary. Then, the following probability is negligible as a function of
η:
Pr[	 ∃tf ∈ Traces(Π) : Exec(A, IK, R, θ) ∈ Concr(tf , θ)]
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proofs found in [19,17,12]. The idea is
to build an adversary against N -PAH which executes A by simulating Exec. The
adversary B also build the symbolic execution corresponding to the computational
execution observed. Whenever A is able to produces an execution that does not
correspond to a valid symbolic execution, then B is able to win against one of her
challenge. Hence the probability that A produces such an execution is bounded by
the advantage of B, which is negligible by assumption. 
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5.3 Relating Symbolic and Computational Properties
Recall that a computational trace property Pc is given by a set of computational
traces and a symbolic trace property Pf is given by a set of symbolic traces. We
say that Pf is a faithful abstraction of Pc for protocol Π, if the probability that a
concretization of a symbolic trace in Pf is not in Pc is negligible. In other words,
the following probability is negligible:
Pr[∃tf ∈ Traces(Π) : tf ∈ Pf∧Exec(A, IK, R, θ) ∈ Concr(tf )∧Exec(A, IK, R, θ) 	∈ Pc].
The following proposition is a preservation result for faithful trace properties.
It states that if the symbolic property is a faithful abstraction of the computational
property and it is satisﬁed in the symbolic model then the concrete property is
satisﬁed in the computational model. It has been applied to mutual authentication
in [19] in which there is also a longer discussion about symbolic/computational
properties.
Proposition 5.2 Let Pf and Pc be a symbolic, respectively a computational, prop-
erty. Let Π be a well-formed protocol that uses a Q-PAH secure library. If Pf is
a faithful abstraction of Pc for Π and if Π |=f Pf , then Π |=c Pc. In other words,
if the protocol satisﬁes the property Pf in the symbolic model then it satisﬁes Pc in
the computational model.
Proof. This proposition is a consequence of Theorem 5.1. Indeed, we have
Pr[Exec(A, IK, R, θ) 	∈ Pc] =
Pr[∃tf ∈ Traces(Π) : tf ∈ Pf ∧ Exec(A, IK, R, θ) ∈ Concr(tf)]+
Pr[∃tf ∈ Traces(Π) : tf 	∈ Pf ∧ Exec(A, IK, R, θ) ∈ Concr(tf)]+
Pr[	 ∃tf ∈ Traces(Π) : Exec(A, IK, R, θ) ∈ Concr(tf )]
= ν(η) + 0 + ν ′(η)
where ν and ν ′ are negligible. 
A similar result can be proven for SecNonce [12].
Theorem 5.3 Let Π be a well-formed protocol that uses a Q-PAH secure library,
N a nonce in Π never sent under a hash and A an adversary. If Π |=f Secret(N)
then Π |=c SecNonce(N).
Proof. The proof is very similar to Theorem 5.1. 
We remark that we cannot deal with computational secrecy of nonces sent in
hashes. It is because we do not assume with our HASH criterion that hash functions
ensure indistinguishability. We only assume that a hash does not leak enough
information to obtain the entire hashed message. A deﬁnition for secrecy of nonce
that may be sent in hashes is given in [11].
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Conclusion
The main contributions of this paper are the following: a formal deﬁnition of a
correctness criterion for hash functions (that is easily met in the random oracle
model). A proof of correctness of the Dolev-Yao model for protocols that may
combine an asymmetric scheme and a hash function. The proof of our theorem
makes some restrictions on the protocols that are in practice easily met. As future
work, it would be of interest to investigate whether correctness of Dolev-Yao can
be proved under weaker assumptions on the cryptographic primitives. Moreover, it
would be signiﬁcant to extend this result to other security properties.
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